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Abstract
Detecting exploits is crucial since the effect of undetected ones can be devastating. Identi-
fying their presence on the network allows us to respond and block their malicious payload
before they cause damage to the system. Inspecting the payload of network traffic may offer
better performance in detecting exploits as they tend to hide their presence and behave
similarly to legitimate traffic.
Previous works on deep packet inspection for detecting malicious traffic regularly read
the full length of application layer messages. As the length varies, longer messages will
take more time to analyse, during which time the attack creates a disruptive impact on the
system. Hence, we propose a novel early exploit detection mechanism that scans network
traffic, reading only 35.21% of application layer messages to predict malicious traffic while
retaining 97.57% detection rate, and a 1.93% false positive rate.
Our recurrent neural network (RNN)-based model is the first work to our knowledge that
provides early prediction of malicious application layer messages, thus detecting a potential
attack earlier than other state-of-the-art approaches, and enabling a form of early warning
system.
Keywords: exploit detection, early prediction, payload analyses, nids, recurrent neural
networks, deep learning.
1. Introduction
Exploits are attacks on systems that take advantage of the existence of bugs and vulner-
abilities. They infiltrate the system by giving the system an input which triggers malicious
behaviour. As time passes, the number of bugs and vulnerabilities increases, along with the
number of exploits. In the first quarter of 2019, there were 400,000 new exploits [1], while
more than 16 million exploits have been released in total. Exploits exist in most Operating
Systems (OS), hence detecting exploits early is crucial to minimise potential damage.
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By exploiting a vulnerability attackers can, for example, gain access to remote systems,
send a remote exploit, or escalate their privilege on a system. Exploits-DB [2] is a website
that archives exploits, both remote and local ones. The number of existing remote exploits
on the website is almost double that of the local ones, which suggests remote exploits are
more prevalent. No physical access to the system is required to execute a remote exploit,
thus the attack can be launched from anywhere in the world.
Remote exploits normally carry a piece of code as a payload, which will be executed
once a vulnerability has been successfully exploited. An exploit is analogous to a tool for
breaking into a house and its payload is something the burglar would do once they are inside
the house. Without this payload, exploits would be merely a tool to demonstrate that an
application is vulnerable. Exploit payloads may take many forms; they could be written in
machine code, a server-side scripting language (e.g., PHP, Python, Ruby), or OS specific
commands (e.g., Bash).
One way to detect exploits is to scan network traffic for their presence. In doing this,
the exploit can be detected before it arrives at the vulnerable system. If this is achieved,
earlier action can be taken to minimise or nullify the damage. There is also no need to run
the exploit in a clone server or Virtual Machine (VM) to be analysed - as it is usually the
case in host-based detection approaches, making this approach more time efficient to block
and provide rapid response to attacks. Therefore, detecting exploits in network traffic is a
promising way to prevent remote exploits from infecting protected systems.
Detecting exploits on the wire has challenges. Firstly, processing the vast amount of data
without decreasing network throughput below acceptable levels; quality of service is still a
priority. Secondly, there are various ways to encode exploit payloads [3], by modifying the
exploit payload to make it appear different, yet still achieve the same goal. This technique
makes it easy to evade any rule-based detection. Lastly, encrypted traffic is also a challenge;
attackers may transmit the exploit with an encrypted protocol e.g., HTTPS.
There are many ways to detect exploits in network traffic. Rule-based detection systems
work by matching signatures of known attacks to the network traffic. Anything that matches
the rule is deemed malicious. The most prevalent open source intrusion detection system,
Snort [4], has a rule that marks any traffic which contains byte 0x90 as shellcode-related
traffic. This rule is based on the knowledge that most x86-based shellcodes are preceded
by a sequence of no operation (NOP) instructions in which the bytes normally contain this
value. However, this rule can easily be evaded by employing other NOP instructions, such
as the “0x41 0x49” sequence. Apart from that, rule-based detection systems are susceptible
to zero-day attacks for which no detection rule exists. Such systems are unable to detect
these attacks until the rule database is updated with the new attack signature.
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms are capable of classifying objects and artefacts based
on features exhibited in data, and handle various modalities of input. ML has been success-
fully applied in many domains with a high success rate, such as image classification, natural
language processing, speech recognition, and even intrusion detection system. There has
been much research on implementing machine learning to address network intrusion detec-
tion [5]. Researchers typically provide training examples of malicious and legitimate traffic
to the ML algorithm that can then be used to determine whether new (unseen) traffic is ma-
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licious. However, there are three key limitations with existing research: Firstly, most of the
research uses old datasets e.g., either KDD99 or DARPA99 [6]. The traffic in those datasets
may not represent recent network traces since network protocols have evolved during these
years, as have the attacks. Secondly, many of the previous works focus solely on the header
information of network packets and process packets individually [6]. Yet, it is known that
exploits may exhibit similar statistical attributes to legitimate traffic at a header-level and
use evasion techniques such as packet fragmentation to hide their existence [3]. Therefore,
we argue that network payload features may capture exploits better, and this area is still
actively expanding as shown by the number of research mentioned in Table 1. This argu-
ment brings us to the third limitation: Existing methods that use payload features, i.e.,
byte frequencies or n-grams, usually involve reading the payload of whole application layer
messages (see Section 2). The issue is that these messages can be lengthy and spread over
multiple network packets. Reading the whole messages before making a decision may lead
to a delay in detecting the attack and gives the exploit time to execute before an alert is
raised.
We, therefore, propose Blatta, an early exploit detection system which reads application
layer messages and predicts whether these messages are likely to be malicious by reading
only the first few bytes. This is the first work to our knowledge that provides early prediction
of malicious application layer messages, thus detecting a potential attack earlier than other
state-of-the-art approaches, and enabling a form of early warning system. Blatta utilises a
Recurrent Neural Network-based (RNN) model and n-grams to make the prediction. A RNN
is a type of artificial neural networks that takes a sequence-based vector as input - in this
case, a sequence of n-grams from an application layer message - and considers the temporal
behaviour of the sequence so that they are not treated independently. There has been a
limited amount of research on payload-based intrusion detection which used a RNN or its
further development (i.e., Long Short-Term Memory [7, 8] and Gated Recurrent Unit [9]),
but earlier research did not make predictive decisions early as they only used 1-grams of
full-length application layer messages as features, which lacks contextual information - a key
benefit of higher-order n-grams. Other work that does consider higher-order sequences of
ngrams (e.g. [10, 11]) are also yet to develop methods that provide early stage prediction,
preferring methods that require the full payload as input to a classifier.
To evaluate the proposed system, we generated an exploit traffic dataset by running
exploits in Metasploit [12] with various exploit payloads and encoders. An exploit payload
is a piece of code that will be executed once the exploit has successfully infiltrated the
system. An encoder is used to change how the exploit payload appears while keeping its
functionality. Our dataset contains traffic from 5,687 working exploits. Apart from that, we
also used a more recent intrusion detection dataset, UNSW-NB15 [13], thus enabling our
method to be compared with previous works.
To summarise, the key contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Proposed an early prediction of exploit traffic, Blatta, using a novel approach of using
an RNN and high-order n-grams to make predictive decisions while still considering
temporal behaviour of a sequence of n-grams. Blatta is the first, to the best of our
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knowledge, who introduce early exploit detection. Blatta detects exploit payloads as
they enter the protected network and is able to predict the exploit by reading 35.21%
of application layer messages on average. Blatta thus enables actions to be taken to
block the attack earlier and therefore reduce the harm to the system.
• Generated a dataset of exploit traffic with various exploit payloads and encoders,
resulting in 5,687 unique connections. The exploit traffic in the dataset was ensured
to contain actual exploit code, making the dataset closer to reality.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a summary of previous
works in this area. Section 3 explains the datasets we used to test our proposed method.
How Blatta works is explained in Section 4. Then, Section 5 explains our extensive ex-
perimentation with Blatta. We also discuss possible evasion techniques to our approach in
Section 6. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 7.
2. Related Works
The earliest solution to detecting exploit activities used pattern matching and regular
expression [4]. Rules are defined by system administrators and are then applied to the
network traffic to identify a match. When a matching pattern is found, the system raises an
alert and possibly shows which part of the traffic matches the rule. The disadvantage of this
approach is that the rules must be kept up to date. Any variation to the exploit payload
which is done by using encoders may defeat such detection.
ML approaches are capable of recognising previously seen instances of objects, such
methods aim to generalise to unseen objects. ML is able to learn patterns or behaviour
from features present in training data and classify which class an unseen object belongs to.
However, to work, suitable hand-crafted features must be engineered for the ML algorithm
to make an accurate prediction. Some previous works defined their feature set by extracting
information from application layer message. Bortolameotti et al. [14] and Bartos et al. [15]
generated their features from HTTP request URI and HTTP headers, i.e., host, constant
header fields, size, user-agent, and language. The authors then clustered the legitimate traffic
based on those features. Zhang et al. [16] tracked DNS and HTTP traffic and calculated
pairwise features of two events to see their similarity. These features were obtained from the
transport and application layer. One of their features is the semantical similarity between
two HTTP requests.
Features derived from a specific protocol may capture specific behaviour of legitimate
traffic. However, this feature extraction method has a drawback. A different set of features
is needed for every application layer protocol that might be used in the network. Some
research borrows the feature extraction method from natural language processing problems
to have protocol-agnostic features, using n-grams.
One of the first leading research in payload analysis is PAYL Wang and Stolfo [17]. It
extracts 1-grams from all bytes of the payload as a representation of the network traffic and
is trained over a set of those 1-grams. PAYL [17] measures the distance between the new
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incoming traffic with the model with a simplified Mahalanobis distance. Similar to PAYL,
Oza et al. [18] extracts n-grams of HTTP traffic with various n values. They compared
three different statistical models to detect anomalies/attacks. HMMPayl [19] is another
work based on PAYL which uses Hidden Markov Models to detect anomalies. OCPAD [11]
stores the n-grams of bytes in a probability tree and uses one-class Na¨ıve Bayes classifier
to detect malicious traffic. Pratomo et al. [20] proposed an Autoencoder model to detect
anomalous low-rate attacks on the network and [21] used stacked Autoencoders to detect
attacks on Industrial Control Systems. Golait and Hubballi [22] developed Probabilistic
Counting Deterministic Timed Automata which inspects byte values of application layer
messages to identify attacks on VOIP applications. Min et al. [23] extracts words from the
application layer message and detect web-based attacks with a combination of Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) and Random Forest. A common approach that is found on all of
the aforementioned works is they read all bytes in each packet or application layer message
and do not decide until all bytes have been read, at which point it is possible the exploit
has already infected the system and targeted the vulnerability.
Other researches argue that exploit traffic is most likely to contain shellcode, a short
sequence of machine code. Therefore, to get a better representation of exploit traffic, they
performed static analysis on the network traffic. Zhao and Ahn [24] disassemble byte se-
quences to opcode sequences and calculate probabilities of opcodes transition to detect
shellcode presence. Shabtai et al. [25] utilise n-grams that comprise machine instructions
instead of bytes. SigFree [26] detects buffer overflow attempts on Internet services by con-
structing an instruction flow graph for each request and analysing the graph to determine if
the request contains machine instructions. Any network traffic that contains valid machine
instructions is deemed malicious. However, none of these consider that an exploit may also
contain server-side scripting language or OS commands instead of shellcode.
In this paper, we proposed Blatta, an exploit attack detection system that (i) provides
early detection of exploits in network traffic rather than waiting until the whole payload
has been delivered, enabling proactive blocking of attacks, and (ii) is capable of detecting
payloads that include malicious server-side scripting languages, machine instructions, and
OS commands, enhancing the previous state of the art that only focuses on shellcode. The
summary of the proposed method and previous works is also shown in Table 1.
Blatta utilises a recurrent neural network (RNN)-based model which takes a sequence of
n-grams from network payload as the input. There has been limited research on developing
RNNs to analyse payload data [7, 8, 9]. All of these works feed individual bytes (1-grams)
from the payload as the features to their RNN model. However, 1-grams do not carry infor-
mation about context of the payload string as a sequence of activities. Therefore, we model
the payload as high-order n-grams where n > 1 as to capture more contextual information
about the network payload. We directly compare 1-grams to higher-order n-grams in our
experiments. Moreover, while related work such as [27]’s, [28], and OCPAD [11] previously
used high-order n-grams, they did not utilise a model capable of learning sequences of activ-
ities and thus not capable of making early-stage predictions within a sequence. Our novel
RNN-based model will consider the long-term dependency of the sequence of n-grams.
An RNN-based model normally takes a sequence as input, processes each item sequen-
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tially, and outputs the decision after it has finished processing the last item of the sequence.
The earlier works which used RNN has this behaviour [7, 8]. While for Blatta to be able to
early predict the exploit traffic, it takes the intermediate output of the RNN-based model,
not waiting for full-length message to be processed. Our experiments show that this approach
has little effect to accuracy, and enables us to make earlier network attack predictions while
retaining high accuracy and a low false positive rate.
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3. Datasets and Threat Model
Several datasets have been used to evaluate network-based intrusion detection systems.
DARPA released the KDD99 Cup, IDSEVAL 98, and IDSEVAL 99 datasets [32]. They
have been widely used over time despite some criticism that it does not model the attacks
correctly [33]. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory released their anonymised captured
traffic [34] (LBNL05). More recently, Shiravi et al. released ISCX12 dataset [35] in which
they collected seven days worth of traffic and provided the label for each connection in
XML format. Moustafa and Slay published the UNSW-NB15 dataset [13] which had been
generated by using the IXIA Perfectstorm tool for generating a hybrid of real modern normal
activities and synthetic contemporary attack behaviours. This dataset provides PCAP files
along with the preprocessed traffic obtained by Bro-IDS [36] and Argus [37].
Moustafa and Slay captured the network traffic in two days, on the 22th January and
17th February 2015. For brevity, we refer to those two parts of UNSW-NB15 as UNSW-JAN
and UNSW-FEB respectively. Both days contain malicious and benign traffic. Therefore,
there has to be an effort to separate them if we would like to use the raw information from
the PCAP files, not the preprocessed information written in the CSV files. The advantage of
this dataset over ISCX12 is that UNSW-NB15 contains information on the type of attacks
and thus we are able to select which kind of attacks are needed, i.e., Exploits and Worms.
However, after analysing this dataset in depth, we observed that the exploit traffic in the
dataset is often barely distinguishable from the normal traffic as some of them do not
contain any exploit payload. Our explanation for this is that exploit attempts may not have
been successful, thus they did not get to the point where the actual exploit payload was
transmitted and recorded in PCAP files. Therefore, we opted to generate our exploit traffic
dataset, the BlattaSploit dataset.
3.1. BlattaSploit Dataset
To develop an exploit traffic dataset we set up two virtual machines that acted as vul-
nerable servers to be attacked. The first server was installed with Metasploitable 2 [38], a
vulnerable OS designed to be infiltrated by Metasploit [12]. The second one was installed
with Debian 5, vulnerable services, and Wordpress 4.1.18. Both servers were set up in the
victim subnet while the attacker machine was placed in a different subnet. These subnets
were connected with a router. The router was used to capture the traffic as depicted in
Figure 1. Although, the network topology is less complex than what we would have in the
real-world, this setup still generates representative data as the payloads are intact regardless
of the number of hops the packets go through.
To launch exploits on the vulnerable servers, we utilised Metasploit, an exploitation tool
which is normally used for penetration testing [12]. Metasploit has a collection of working
exploits and is updated regularly with new exploits. There are around 9,000 exploits for
Linux and Unix-based applications and to make the dataset more diverse, we also employed
different exploit payloads and encoders. An exploit payload is a piece of code which is
intended to be executed on the remote machine, and an encoder is a technique to modify
the appearance of particular exploit code to avoid signature-based detection. Each exploit
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192.168.66.6
Metasploitable VM
192.168.99.9
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192.168.99.6
Switch SwitchRouter
Figure 1: Network topology for generating exploit traffic. Attacker VM running Metasploit and target VMs
are placed in different network connected by a router. This router is used to capture all traffic from these
virtual machines.
in Metasploit has its own set of compatible exploit payloads and encoders. In this paper,
we used all possible combinations of exploit payloads and encoders.
We then ran the exploits against the vulnerable servers and captured the traffic using
tcpdump. Traffic generated by each exploit was stored in an individual PCAP file. By
doing so, we know which specific type of exploit the packets belonged to. Timestamps are
normally used to mark which packets belong to a class but this information would not be
reliable since packets may not come in order and if there is more than one source sending
traffic at a time, their packet may get mixed up with other sources.
When analysing the PCAP files we found out that not all exploits had run successfully.
Some of them failed to send anything to the targeted servers, some others did not send any
malicious traffic, e.g., sending login request only, sending requests for non-existent files. This
supported our earlier thoughts on why the UNSW-NB15 dataset was lacking exploit payload
traffic. Therefore, we removed capture files that had no traffic or too little information to
be distinguished from normal traffic. In the end, we produced 5,687 PCAP files which also
represents the number of distinct sets of exploit, exploit payloads, and encoders. Since we are
interested in application layer messages, all PCAP files were preprocessed with tcpflow [39]
to obtain the application layer message for each TCP connection. The summary of this
dataset is shown in Table 2.
The next step for this exploit traffic dataset was to annotate the traffic. All samples
can be considered malicious, however, we decided to make the dataset more detailed by
adding the type of exploit payload contained inside the traffic, and the location of the
exploit payload. There are eight types of exploit payload in this dataset. They are written
in JavaScript, PHP, Perl, Python, Ruby, Shell script (e.g., Bash, ZSH), SQL, and byte
code/opcode for shellcode-based exploits.
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Table 2: A summary of exploits captured in the BlattaSploit Dataset. The numbers next to the protocols
are the number of connections in the application layer protocols.
Number of TCP Connections 5,687
Protocols
HTTP (3857), FTP (6), SMTP
(74), POP3 (93)
Payload Types
Javascript, Shellcode, Perl, PHP,
Python, Ruby, Bash, SQL
There are some cases where an exploit contains an exploit payload “wrapped” in another
scripting language. For example, a Python script to do reverse shell connection which uses
the Bash echo command at the beginning. For these cases, the type of the exploit payload
is the one with the longest byte sequence. In this case, the type of the particular connection
is Python.
It is also important to note whilst the vulnerable servers in our setup using a 7 years old
operating system, the payload carried by the exploit were the identical payload to a more
recent exploit would have used. For example, both CVE-2019-9670 (disclosed in 2019) and
CVE-2012-1495 (disclosed in 2012) can use generic/shell bind tcp as a payload. The
traffic generated by both exploits will still be similar. Therefore, we argue that our dataset
still represent the current attacks. Moreover, only successful exploit attacks are kept in the
dataset, making the the recorded traffic more realistic.
3.2. Threat model
A threat model is a list of potential things that may affect protected systems. Having
one means we can identify which part is the focus of our proposed approach, thus in this
case, we can potentially understand better what to look for in order to detect the malicious
traffic and what the limitations are.
The proposed method focuses on detecting remote exploits by reading application layer
messages from the unencrypted network traffic, although the detection method of Blatta can
be incorporated with application layer firewalls i.e., web application firewalls. Therefore, we
can still detect the exploit attempt before it reaches the protected application. In general,
the type of attacks we consider here are:
(1) Remote exploits to servers that send malicious scripting languages (e.g., PHP, Ruby,
Python, or SQL), shellcode, or Bash scripts to maintain control to the server or gained access
to it remotely. For example, apache continuum cmd exec exploit with reverse shell payload
which will force the targeted server to open a connection to the attacking computer and
provide shell access to the attacker. By focusing on the connections directed to servers, we
can safely assume JavaScript code in the application layer message could also be malicious
since normally JavaScript code is sent from server to client, not the other way around.
(2) Exploit attacks that utilise one of the text-based protocols over TCP, i.e., HTTP
and FTP. Text-based protocols tend to be more well structured, therefore we can apply
natural language processing based approach. The case would be be similar to document
classification.
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(3) Other attacks that may utilise remote exploits are also considered, i.e., worms. Worms
in the UNSW-NB15 dataset contains exploit code used to propagate themselves.
4. Methodology
Extracting features from application layer messages is the first step toward an early
prediction method. We could use variable values in the message (e.g., HTTP header values,
FTP commands, SMTP header values), but it would require us to extract a different set of
features from each application layer protocol. It is preferable to have a generic feature set
which applies to various application layer protocols. Therefore, we proposed of using n-grams
to model the application layer message as they carry more information than a sequence of
bytes. For instance, it would be difficult for a model to determine what a sequence of bytes
’G’, ’E’, ’T’, space, ’/’ and so on means as those individual bytes may appear anywhere
in a different order. However, if the model has 3-grams of the sequence (i.e., ’GET’, ’ET
’, ’T /’, and so on), the model would learn something more meaningful such as that the
string could be an HTTP message. The advantage of using high-order n-grams where n > 1
is also shown by Anagram [10], Rieck and Laskov [40], and OCPAD [11]. However, these
works did not consider the temporal behaviour of a sequence of n-grams as their model was
not capable of doing that. Therefore, Blatta utilised a recurrent neural network (RNN) to
analyse the sequence of n-grams which were obtained from an application layer message.
An RNN takes a sequence of inputs and processes them sequentially in several time steps,
enabling the model to learn the temporal behaviour of those inputs. In this case, the input to
each time step is an n-gram, unlike earlier works which also utilised an RNN model but took
a byte value as the input to each RNN time step [7, 8]. Moreover, these works took the output
from the last time step to make decision, while our novel approach produces classification
outputs at intermediate intervals as the RNN model is already confident about the decision.
We argue that this approach will enable the proposed system to predict whether a connection
is malicious without reading the full length of application layer messages, therefore providing
an early warning method.
In general, as shown in Figure 2, the training and detection process of Blatta are as
follows:
Training stage. n-grams are extracted from application layer messages. l most common
n-grams are stored in a dictionary. This dictionary is used to encode an n-gram to an integer.
The encoded n-grams are then fed into an RNN model, training the model to classify whether
the traffic is legitimate or malicious.
Detection stage. For each new incoming TCP connection directed to the server, we
reconstruct the application layer message, obtain a full length or partial bytes of them, and
determine if the sequence belongs to malicious traffic.
4.1. Data Preprocessing
In well-structured documents such as text-based application layer protocols, byte se-
quences can be a distinguishing feature that make each message in their respective class
differ from each other. Blatta takes the byte sequence of application layer messages from
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Network Packets
TCP Reconstruction
Application 
Layer messages 
(i.e. HTTP 
requests, SMTP 
commands)
n-grams
RNN-based model
Most common n-grams in 
the training set
Malicious
Legitimate
Figure 2: Architecture overview of the proposed method. Application layer messages are extracted from
captured traffic using tcpflow [39]. n-grams are obtained from those messages. They will then be used to
build a dictionary of most common n-grams and train the RNN-based model (i.e., LSTM and GRU). The
trained model output a prediction whether the traffic is malicious or benign.
network traffic. The application layer messages need to be reconstructed as the message
may be split into multiple TCP segments and transmitted in an arbitrary order. We utilise
tcpflow [39] to read PCAP files, reconstruct TCP segments, and obtain the application
layer messages.
We then represent the byte sequence as a collection of n-grams taken with various stride
value. An n-gram is a consecutive sequence of n items from a given sample, in this case, an
n-gram is a consecutive series of bytes obtained from the application layer message. Stride is
how many steps the sliding window takes when collecting n-grams. Figure 3 shows examples
of various n-grams obtained with a different value of n and stride.
We define the input to the classifier to be a set of integer encoded n-grams. Let X =
HELLO_WORLD
HEL ELL LLO LO_ O_W ...
HEL LLO O_W WOR RLD
HEL LO_ WOR
String:
n-grams, n=3, stride=1:
n-grams, n=3, stride=2:
n-grams, n=3, stride=3:
Figure 3: An example of n-grams of bytes taken with various stride values.
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{x1, x2, x3, ..., xk} be the integer encoded n-grams collected from an application layer message
as the input to the RNN model. We denote k as the number of n-grams taken from each
application layer message. Each n-gram is categorical data. It means a value of 1 is not
necessarily smaller than a value of 50. They are simply different. Encoding n-grams with
one-hot encoding is not a viable solution as the resulting vector would be sparse and hard
to model. Therefore, Blatta transforms the sequence of n-grams with embedding technique.
Embedding is essentially a lookup table that maps an item to a dense vector with a fixed size
embedded dim. Using pretrained embedding vectors, e.g. GloVe [41], is common in natural
language processing problems, but these pretrained embedding vectors were generated from
a corpus of words. While our approach works with byte-level n-grams. Therefore, it is
not possible to use the pretrained embedding vectors. Instead, we initialise the embedding
vectors with random values which will be updated by backpropagation during the training
so that n-grams which usually appear together will have vectors that are close to each other.
It is worth noting that the number of n-grams collected raises exponentially as the n
increases. If we considered all possible n-gram values, the model would overfit. Therefore,
we limit the number of embedding vectors by building a dictionary of most-common n-grams
in the training set. We define the dictionary size as l in which it contains l unique n-grams
and a placeholder for other n-grams that do not exist in the dictionary. Thus the embedding
vectors has l+ 1 entries. However, we would like the size of each embedded vector to be less
than l + 1. Let ε be the size of an embedded vector (embedded dim). If xt represents an
n-gram, the embedding layer transforms X to Xˆ. We denote Xˆ = {xˆ1, ..., xˆk} where each
xˆ is a vector with the size of ε. The embedded vectors Xˆ are then passed to the recurrent
layer.
4.2. Training RNN-based Classifier
Since the input to the classifier is sequential data, we opted to use a method that takes
into account the sequential relationship of elements in the input vectors. Such methods
capture the behaviour of a sequence better than processing those elements individually [42].
A Recurrent Neural Networks is an architecture of neural networks in which each layer takes
time series data, processes them in several time steps, and utilises the output of the previous
time step in the current step calculation. We refer to these layers as recurrent layers. Each
recurrent layer consists of recurrent units.
The vanilla RNN has a vanishing gradient problem, a situation where the recurrent
model cannot be further trained because the value to update the weight is too small thus
there would be no point of training the model further. Therefore, Long Short-Term Mem-
ory (LSTM) [43] and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [44] are employed to avoid this situation.
Both LSTM and GRU have cells/units that are connected recurrently to each other, replac-
ing the usual recurrent units which existed in earlier RNNs. What makes their cells different
is the existence of gates. These gates decide whether to pass certain information coming
from the previous cell (i.e., input gate and forget gate in LSTM unit, update gate in GRU) or
going to the next unit (i.e., output gate in LSTM). Since LSTM has more gates than GRU,
it requires more calculations, thus computationally more expensive. Yet it is not conclusive
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whether one is better than the other [44], thus we use both types and compare the results.
For brevity, we will refer to both types as recurrent layers and their cells as recurrent units.
The recurrent layer takes a vector xˆt for each time step t. In each time step, the recurrent
unit outputs hidden state ht with a dimension of |ht|. The hidden state is then passed to
the next recurrent unit. The last hidden state hk becomes the output of the recurrent layer
which will be passed onto the next layer.
Once we obtain hk, the output of the recurrent layer, the next step is to map the vec-
tor to benign or malicious class. Mapping hk to those classes requires us to use linear
transformation and softmax activation unit.
A linear transformation transforms hk into a new vector L using Equation (1), where
W is the trained weight and b is the trained bias. After that, we transform L to obtain
Y = {yi| 0 6 i < 2 }, the log probabilities of the input file belonging to the classes
with LogSoftmax, as described in Equation (2). The output of LogSoftmax is the index of
an element that has the largest probability in Y . All these forward steps are depicted in
Figure 4.
L = W ∗ hk + b,L = { li | 0 6 i < 2 } (1)
Y = arg max
0 6 i < 2
(
log
exp(li)∑2
i=0 exp(li)
)
(2)
In the training stage, after feeding a batch of training data to the model and obtaining
the output, the next step is to evaluate the accuracy of our model. To measure our model’s
performance during the training stage, we need to calculate a loss value which represents
how far our model’s output is from the ground truth. Since this approach is a binary
classification problem, we use Negative Log Likelihood [45] as the loss function. Then the
losses are backpropagated to update weights, biases, and the embedding vectors.
4.3. Detecting Exploits
The process of detecting exploits is essentially similar to the training process. Application
layer messages are extracted. n-grams are acquired from these messages and encoded using
the dictionary that was built during the training process. The encoded n-grams are then
fed into the RNN model that will output probabilities of these messages being malicious.
When the probability of an application layer message being malicious is higher than 0.5, the
message is deemed malicious and an alert is raised.
The main difference in this process to the training stage is the time when Blatta stops
processing inputs and makes the decision. Blatta takes the intermediate output of the
RNN model, hence requiring fewer inputs and disregarding the needs to wait for the full-
length message to process. We will show in our experiment that the decision taken by using
intermediate output and reading fewer bytes is close to reading the full-length message.
Giving the proposed approach an ability of early prediction.
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Figure 4: A detailed view of the classifier. n-grams are extracted from the input application layer message
which are then used to train an RNN model to classify whether the connection is malicious or benign.
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5. Experiments and Results
In this section, we evaluate Blatta and present evidence of its effectiveness in predicting
exploit in network traffic. Blatta is implemented with Python 3.5.2 and PyTorch 0.2.0
library. All experiments were run on a PC with Core i7 @ 3.40GHz, 16 GB of RAM,
NVIDIA GeForce GT 730, NVIDIA CUDA 9.0, and CUDNN 7.
The best practice for evaluating a machine learning approach is to have separate training
and testing set. As the name implies, training set is used to train the model and the testing
set is for evaluating the model’s performance. We split BlattaSploit dataset in an 60:40
ratio for training and testing set as malicious samples. The division was carefully taken to
include diverse type of exploit payloads. As samples of benign traffic to train the model, we
obtained the same number of HTTP and FTP connections as the malicious samples from
UNSW-JAN. Having a balanced set of both classes is important in a supervised learning.
We measure our model’s performance by using samples of malicious and benign traf-
fic. Malicious samples are obtained from 40% of BlattaSploit dataset, exploits and worms
samples in UNSW-FEB set (10,855 samples). As for the benign samples, we took the same
number (10,855) of benign HTTP and FTP connections in UNSW-FEB. We used the UNSW
dataset to compare our proposed approach performance with previous works.
In summary, the details of training and testing sets used in the experiments are shown
in Table 3.
Table 3: Numbers of benign and malicious samples used in the experiments.
Set Obtained from Num of samples Class
Training Set BlattaSploit 3,406 Malicious
UNSW-JAN 3,406 Benign
Testing Set BlattaSploit 2,276 Malicious
UNSW-FEB 10,855 Benign
UNSW-FEB 10,855 Malicious
We evaluated the classifier model by counting the number of true positive (TP), true
negative (TN), false positive (FP), and false negative (FN). They are then used to calculate
detection rate (DR) and false positive rate (FPR) which are metrics to measure our proposed
system’s performance.
DR measures the ability of the proposed system to correctly detect malicious traffic. The
value of DR should be as close as possible to 100%. It would show how well our system able
to detect exploit traffic. The formula to calculate DR is shown in Equation 3. We denote
TP as the number of detected malicious connections and FN as the number of undetected
malicious connections in the testing set.
DR =
TP
TP + FN
(3)
FPR is the percentage of benign samples that are classified as malicious. We would like
to have this metric to be as low as possible. High FPR means many false alarms are raised,
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rendering the system to be less trustworthy and useless. We calculate this metric using the
Equation 4. We denote FP as the number of false positives detected and N as the number
of benign samples.
FPR =
FP
N
(4)
5.1. Data Analysis
Before discussing about the results, it is preferable to analyse the data first to make
sure that the results are valid and the conclusion taken is on point. Blatta aims to detect
exploit traffic by reading the first few bytes of the application layer message. Therefore, it
is important to know how many bytes are there in the application layer messages in our
dataset. Hence, we can be sure that Blatta reads a number of bytes fewer than the full
length of the application layer message.
Table 4 shows the average length of application layer messages in our testing set. The be-
nign samples has an average message length of 593.25, lower than any other sets. Therefore,
deciding after reading fewer bytes than at least that number implies our proposed method
can predict malicious traffic earlier, thus providing improvement over previous works.
Table 4: Average message length of application layer messages in the testing set.
Set Average Message Length
BlattaSploit 2,318.93
UNSW Benign samples 593.25
UNSW Exploit samples 1,437.36
UNSW Worm samples 848
5.2. Exploring Parameters
Blatta includes parameters that must be selected in advance. Intuitively, these param-
eters affect the model performance, so we analysed the effect on model’s performance and
selected the best model to be compared later to previous works. The parameters we analysed
are recurrent layer types, n, stride, dictionary size, the embedding vector dimension, and
the recurrent layer type. When analysing each of these parameters we use different values
for the parameter and set the others to their default values (i.e., n = 5, stride = 1, dictio-
nary size=2000, embedding dim=32, recurrent layer=LSTM, number of hidden layers=1).
These default values were selected based on the preliminary experiment, which had given
the best result. Apart from the modifiable parameters, we set the optimiser to Stochastic
Gradient Descent with learning rate 0.1 as using other optimiser did not necessarily increase
or decrease the performance in our preliminary experiment. The number of epochs is fixed
to five as the loss value did not decrease further, adding more training iteration did not give
significant improvement.
As can be seen in Table 5, we experimented with variable lengths of input to see how
much the difference when the number of bytes read is reduced. It is noted that some messages
are shorter than the limit. In this case, all bytes of the messages are indeed taken.
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In general, reading the full length of application layer messages mostly gives more than
99% detection rate with 2.51% false positive rate. This performance stays still with a minor
variation when the length of input messages is reduced down to 500 bytes. When the length
is limited to 400, the false positive rate spikes up for some configurations. Our hypothesis
is this is due to benign samples have relatively short length. Therefore, we will pay more
attention to the results of reading 500 bytes or fewer and analyse each parameter individually.
n is the number of bytes (n-gram) taken in each time step. As shown in Table 5, we
experimented with 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9-gram. For brevity, we omitted n = 2, 4, 6, 8 because
the result difference is not significant. As predicted earlier, 1-gram were least effective, the
detection rates were around 50%. As for the high-order n-grams, the detection rates are
not much different but the false positive rates are. 5-gram and 7-gram provide better false
positive rates (2.51%) even when Blatta reads the first 400 bytes. 7-gram gives lower false
positive rate (8.92%) when reading first 300 bytes yet it is still too high for real life situation.
Having a higher n means more information is considered in a time step, this may lead to
not only a better performance but also overfitting.
As the default value of n is five, we experimented with stride of one to five. Thus, it can
be observed how the model would react depending on how much the n-grams overlapped.
It is apparent that non-overlapping n-grams provide lower false positives with around 1-3%
decrease in detection rates. A value of two and three for the stride performs the worst, they
missed quite a few malicious traffic.
The dictionary size plays an important role in this experiment. Having too many n-
grams leads to overfitting as the model would have to memorise too many of them that may
barely occur. We found that a dictionary size of 2000 has the highest detection rate and
lowest false positive rate. Reducing the size to 1000 has made the detection rate to drop for
about 50%, even when the model read the full length messages.
Without embedding layer, Blatta would have used a one-hot vector as big as the dictio-
nary size for the input in a time step. Therefore, the embedding dimension has the same
effect as dictionary size. Having it too big leads to overfitting, too little could mean too
much information is lost due to the compression. Our experiments shows a dimension of 16,
32, or 64 give similar detection rates, differs less than 2%. An embedding dimension of 64
can have the least false positive when reading 300 bytes.
Changing recurrent layer do not seem to have much difference. LSTM has a minor
improvement over GRU. We argue that prefering one after the other would not make a big
improvement other than training speed. Adding more hidden layers does not improve the
performance. On the other hand, it has a negative impact on the detection speed, as shown
in Table 6.
After analysing this set of experiments, we ran another experiment with a configuration
based on the best performing parameters previously explained. The configuration is n=5,
stride=5, dictionary size=2000, embedding dimension=64, and a LSTM layer. The model
then has a detection rate of 97.57% with 1.93% false positives by reading only the first 400
bytes. This result shows that Blatta maintains high accuracy while only reading 35.21% the
length of application layer messages in the dataset. This optimal set of parameters is then
used in further analysis.
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5.3. Detection Speed
In the IDS area, detection speed is another metric worth looked into, apart from accuracy-
related metrics. Time is of the essence in detection, the earlier we detect malicious traffic,
the faster we could react. However, detection speed is affected by many factors, such as
the hardware or other applications/services running at the same time as the experiment.
Therefore, in this section, we analyse the difference of execution time between reading the
full and partial payload.
We first calculated the execution time of each record in the testing set, then divided
the number of bytes processed by the execution time to obtain the detection speed in kilo-
bytes/seconds (KBps). Eventually, the detection speed of all records was averaged. The
result is shown in Table 6.
As shown in Table 6, reducing the processed bytes to 700, about half the size of an IP
packet, increased the detection speed by approximately two times (from an average of 8.366
KBps to 16.486 KBps). Evidently, the trend keeps rising as the number of bytes reduced.
If we take the number of bytes limit from the previous section, which is 400 bytes, Blatta
can provide about three times increment in detection speed or 22.17 KBps on average. We
are aware that this number seems small compared to the transmission speed of a link in
the network which can reach 1 Gbps/128 MBps. However, we argued that there are other
factors which limit our proposed method from performing faster, such as the hardware used
in the experiment and the programming language used to implement the approach. Given
the approach runs in a better environment, the detection speed will increase as well.
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Table 6: The effect of reducing the number of bytes to the detection speed. The table shows the average
(mean) detection speed in KBps with 95% confidence interval, calculated from multiple experiments. The
detection speed increased significantly (about three times faster than reading the whole message), allowing
early prediction of malicious traffic.
# of LSTM Layers
# of bytes 1 2 3
All 8.366± 0.238327 5.514± 0.004801 3.698± 0.011428
700 16.486± 0.022857 10.704± 0.022001 7.35± 0.044694
600 18.16± 0.020556 11.97± 0.024792 8.21± 0.049584
500 20.432± 0.02352 13.65± 0.036668 9.376± 0.061855
400 22.17± 0.032205 14.94± 0.037701 10.302± 0.065417
300 24.076± 0.022857 16.368± 0.036352 11.318± 0.083477
200 26.272± 0.030616 18.138± 0.020927 12.688± 0.063024
5.4. Comparison With Previous Works
We compare Blatta results with other related previous works. PAYL [17], OCPAD [11],
Decanter [14], and the autoencoder model [20] were chosen due to their code availability
and both can be tested against the UNSW-NB15 dataset. PAYL and OCPAD read an IP
packet at a time, while Decanter and [20] reconstruct TCP segments and process the whole
application layer message. None of them provides early detection, but to show that Blatta
also offers improvements in detecting malicious traffic, we compare the detection and false
positive rates of those works with Blatta.
We evaluated all methods with Exploits and Worms data in UNWS-NB15 as those match
our threat model and the dataset is already publicly available. Thus the result would be
comparable. The results are shown in Table 7.
In general, Blatta has the highest detection rate - albeit it also comes with the cost of
increasing false positives. Although the false positives might make this approach unaccept-
able in real life, Blatta is still a significant step towards a direction of early prediction, a
problem that has not been explored by similar previous works. This early prediction ap-
proach enables system administrators to react faster, thus reducing the harm to protected
systems.
In our experiments, as shown in Table 5, Blatta needs to read 400 bytes (on average
35.21% of application layer message size) to achieve 97.57% detection rate. It reads fewer
bytes than PAYL, OCPAD, Decanter, and [20] while keeping the accuracy high.
5.5. Visualisation
To investigate how Blatta has performed the detection, we took samples of both benign
and malicious traffic and observed the input and output. We were particularly interested
in the relation of n-grams that are not stored in the dictionary to the decision (unknown
n-grams). Those n-grams either did not exist in the training set or were not common enough
to be included in the dictionary.
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Table 7: Comparison to previous works using the UNSW-NB15 dataset as the testing set.
Method Detection Rate (%) FPR (%)
Exploits in
UNSW-NB15
Worms in
UNSW-NB15
Blatta 99.04 100 1.93
PAYL 87.12 26.49 0.05
OCPAD 10.53 4.11 0.00
Decanter 67.93 90.14 0.03
Autoencoder 47.51 81.12 0.99
On Figure 5, we visualise three samples of traffic taken from different sets, BlattaSploit
and UNSW-NB15 datasets. The first part of each sample shows n-grams that did not exist
in the dictionary. The yellow highlighted parts show those n-grams. The second part show
the output of the recurrent layer for each time step. The darker the red highlight, the closer
the probability of the traffic being malicious to one in that time step.
As shown on Figure 5, malicious samples tend to have more unknown n-grams. It is
evident that the existence of these unknown n-grams increases the probability of the traffic
being malicious. As an example, the first five bytes of the five sample have around 0.5
probability of being malicious. And then the probability went up closer to one when an
unknown n-grams is detected.
Similar behaviour also exist in the benign sample. The probability is quite low because
there are many known n-grams. Despite the existence of unknown n-grams in the benign
sample, the end result shows that the traffic is benign. Furthermore, most of the time the
probability of the traffic being malicious is also below 0.5.
6. Evasion Techniques and Adversarial Attacks
Our proposed approach is not a silver bullet to tackle exploit attacks. There are evasion
techniques which could be employed by adversaries to evade the detection. These techniques
open possibilities for future work. Therefore, this section talks about such evasion techniques
and discuss why they have not been covered by our current method.
Since our proposed method works by analysing application layer messages, it is safe to
disregard evasion techniques on transport or network layer level, e.g., IP fragmentation, TCP
delayed send, TCP segment fragmentation. They should be handled by the underlying tool
that reconstructs TCP session. Furthermore, those evasion techniques can also be avoided
by Snort preprocessor.
Two possible evasion techniques are compression and/or encryption. Both compression
and encryption change the bytes’ value from the original and make the malicious code harder
to detect by Blatta or any previous work [17, 11, 20] on payload-based detection. Metas-
ploit has a collection of evasion techniques which include compression. The compression
evasion technique only works on HTTP and utilises gzip. This technique only compresses
HTTP responses, not HTTP requests. While all HTTP-based exploits in UNSW-NB15 and
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Figure 5: Visualisation of unknown n-grams in the application layer messages and outputs of the recurrent
layer for each time step. It shows how the proposed system observes and analyses the traffic. Yellow blocks
show unknown n-grams. Red blocks show the probability of the traffic being malicious when reading an
n-gram at that point.
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BlattaSploit have their exploit code in the request, thus no data is available to analyse the
performance if the adversary uses compression. However, gzip compressed data could still
be detected because it always starts with the magic number 1f 8b and the decompression
can be done in a streaming manner in which Blatta can do so. There is also no need to
decompress the whole data since Blatta works well with partial input.
Encryption is possibly the biggest obstacle in payload-based NIDS: None of the previous
works in our literature (see Table 1) have addressed this challenge. There are other studies
which deal with payload analysis in encrypted traffic [46, 47]. However, these studies focus
on classifying which application generates the network traffic instead of detecting exploit
attacks, thus they are not directly relevant to our research.
On its own, Blatta is not able to detect exploits hiding in encrypted traffic. However,
Blatta’s model can be exported and incorporated with application-layer firewalls such as
ShadowDaemon [48]. ShadowDaemon is commonly installed on a web server and intercepts
HTTP requests before being processed by a web server software. It detects attacks based
on its signature database. Since it is extensible and reads the same data as Blatta (i.e.,
application layer messages), it is possible to use Blatta’s RNN-based model to extend the
capability of ShadowDaemon beyond rule-based detection. More importantly, this approach
would enable Blatta to deal with encrypted traffic, making it applicable in real-life situations.
Attackers could place the exploit code closer to the end of the application layer message.
Hoping that in doing so, the attack would not be detected as Blatta reads merely the first
few bytes. However, exploits with this kind of evasion technique would still be detected since
this evasion technique needs a padding to place the exploit code at the end of the message.
The padding itself will be detected as a sign of malicious attempts as it is most likely to be
a byte sequence which rarely exist in the benign traffic.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presents Blatta, an early prediction system for exploit attacks which can
detect exploit traffic by reading only 400 bytes from the application layer message. First,
Blatta builds a dictionary containing most common n-grams in the training set. Then, it is
trained over benign and malicious sequences of n-grams to classify exploit traffic. Lastly, it
continuously reads a small chunk of an application layer message and predicts whether the
message will be a malicious one.
Decreasing the number of bytes taken from application layer messages only has a minor
effect on Blatta’s detection rate. Therefore, it does not need to read the whole application
layer message like previously related works to detect exploit traffic, creating a steep change
in the ability of system administrators to detect attacks early and to block them before
the exploit damages the system. Extensive evaluation of the new exploit traffic dataset has
clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of Blatta.
For future study, we would like to train a model that can recognise malicious behaviour
based on messages exchanged between clients and a server since in this paper we only
consider messages from clients to a server, but not the other way around. Detecting attacks
on encrypted traffic while retaining the early prediction capability could be a future research
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direction. It also remains a question whether the approach in mobile traffic classification
[46, 47] would be applicable to the field of exploit detection.
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